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Delivering the 2012 York Centre for Asian Research (YCAR) 
Asia Lecture on the occasion of YCAR’s 10th anniversary, Dr. 
XIANG Biao explores the high cost of legal transnational labour 
migration for unskilled Chinese labourers. Although legal labour 
migration from China has become more effective, efficient and 
streamlined, the costs of finding and securing work overseas 
have been on the rise. In his exploration of the reasons why, 
Xiang points to intermediaries—commercial labour recruiters—
as the key. He argues that intermediaries’ dominant position 
in cultivating, facilitating and controlling legal migration allow 
them to charge high fees to potential migrants. This results 
in the “intermediary trap”, where both the state and the 
migrants depend on intermediaries to manage and facilitate 
labour migration overseas. In this text based on his lecture, 
Xiang examines China’s hierarchical chains of migration 
intermediaries, from Beijing to rural villages, arguing that they 
constitute a transnational labour disciplinary system and point 
to new state-citizen relations.
Unskilled workers from China had to pay an average of USD 
8,000 to work abroad in Japan, Singapore and South Korea, 
their top three choices, in the late 2000s. The exorbitant 
fees were not charged by human smugglers, but by licensed 
recruitment companies. In fact, transnational labour migra-
tion through legal channels cost significantly more than illegal 
migration. 
 To pay to migrate is not unique to China. Research-
ers, policy makers and international organizations have come 
up with a number of explanations for the high cost of labour 
migration from developing countries. The first explanation 
suggests that migration is expensive because the opportunities 
are scarce while the demand is high (see, for example, Abella 
2004). In China, however, the cost increased at the same time 
as when outmigration opportunities became more available. 
More than 850,000 Chinese were working overseas on rela-
tively long-term temporary contracts by the end of 2012, com-
pared to 58,000 in 1990 (Center for International Exchanges 
2005; International Contractors’ Association 2004; Ministry 
of Commerce 2013). During the same period, fees almost 
doubled. The period when outmigration grew the fastest (be-
tween the late 1990s and early 2000s) was also the time when 
the intermediary fee rose the most. Furthermore, it is not at 
all clear whether demand for outmigration had increased, let 
alone whether it drove up the price. The average wage level in 
China rose significantly from the late 1990s onwards, while the 
incomes of unskilled migrants in the three Asian destinations 
of Chinese outmigrants remained stagnant (they averaged 
USD 1,000 a month) from the early 1990s. The fact that some 
would-be migrants were willing to pay to migrate should by no 
means be understood as a natural outcome of the demand-
supply equilibrium. It is instead a peculiar phenomenon that 
needs to be explained.
 The second usual explanation points to the fact that 
the transnational labour market requires extra resources to 
match the demand and the supply across borders, which 
makes migration expensive. Once the market becomes ma-
ture, with more developed information flows and social 
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networks, it would imply that transaction costs would come 
down (Elrick and Lewandowska 2008). The Chinese case again 
suggests the opposite. Take labour migration to Singapore as 
an example. When two of the earliest Singaporean migrant 
worker recruiting companies visited Fujian province in south-
east China in 1990 to recruit female factory workers, they paid 
their Fujian counterparts a RMB 800 “labour mobilization fee” 
(laowu dongyuan fei) for every worker recruited and subse-
quently RMB 200 per month throughout the employment pe-
riod. Nothing was charged to the migrants. Transnational ties 
soon developed and recruitment networks spread. As a result, 
the cost of migration increased. By 1993, a Singapore interme-
diary charged its China collaborator at least RMB 12,000 for 
every job opening. The collaborator, in turn, demanded a fee 
between RMB 20,000 and 30,000 from the migrant.1
 The third usual explanation attributes the high cost 
to government red tape. Cumbersome government regula-
tion means that migrants have to invest extra resources either 
to meet the requirements or to circumvent them. In China, 
however, what accompanied the rise of fees was the signifi-
cant liberalization of government regulation over outmigra-
tion. A 1986 law allowed ordinary Chinese to apply for private 
passports, and by 2005 most Chinese could obtain passports 
simply by presenting their ID cards and criminal clearance. The 
2007 Passport Law enshrines it as a citizen’s right to possess a 
passport. International labour outmigration, which used to be 
possible only through state projects, was now encouraged as 
an individual strategy for economic betterment. Policy changes 
in the receiving countries were more ambiguous, but in gen-
eral temporary labour migration schemes were expanded and 
streamlined, though permanent settlement for the low-skilled 
became more difficult. This was the case in Asia as well as in 
North America, Europe and Australasia. Then, given this evolu-
tion, why did the migrants have to pay so much? The migrants 
had their own answer. Migration was expensive because 
intermediaries—commercial labour recruiters—made it so. 
There were so many intermediaries and they charged so much 
simply because they were there and they could do so.  
This banal, seemingly tautological explanation is exactly what 
I concluded after a four-year field research spanning Japan, 
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Singapore, South Korea and multiple locations in northeast 
China from 2004 to 2008, corroborated with documentary re-
search. Intermediaries were the key. There was no single cause 
for the existence and business activities of the intermediaries. 
Instead they must be explained through a particular structural 
condition. I call this structural condition the intermediary trap. 
In this condition intermediaries gained a dominant position in 
cultivating, facilitating and controlling migration despite their 
supposedly supplementary role. 
 By trap, I mean the dependency of the state and the 
migrants on the intermediaries. Yet, this trapping is unlike the 
“capture” (for instance, in the cases of “regulatory capture” 
or “elite capture of the state”) that resulted from interest 
groups’ intentional manoeuvres that subjugate the interests 
of the regulators, the competitors or the public to one’s own. 
The trap, by comparison, emerged from voluntary interactions 
between migrants, foreign employers, government agencies 
and intermediaries. As such the internal relations in the trap 
were unstable and dynamic. For instance, sometimes migrants 
worked with intermediaries to circumvent state regulations, 
and at other times migrants worked with the state to counter 
intermediaries. The actors were trapped not by coercion, but 
by the lack of alternatives. I also use the term trap to evoke 
the image of a net. At the core of the intermediary trap were 
intricate networks that tied different types of intermediaries 
together. The intermediaries depended on, benefited from 
and were constrained by each other. In other words, they were 
trapped themselves. The intermediary trap at the same time 
linked the intermediaries to other parties and institutions in 
multiple ways. In sum, intermediaries made money by making 
themselves indispensable for workers in pursuing their migra-
tion projects and indispensable for states in making order from 
migration.
 Migration intermediaries were of course everywhere 
in the world; intermediaries in general were also common 
throughout human history, especially in imperial China. What 
was special about labour migration from China to other Asian 
countries at the time of my research was the intermediary 
trap. It was a central part of an emerging configuration govern-
ing low-skilled labour migration in East Asia. Despite the media 
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scares about supposedly uncontrollable illegal migration, 
China and East Asia have witnessed a simultaneous increase 
in the level of mobility and in the effectiveness of its regula-
tion.2 Illegal outmigration from China decreased significantly 
in the 1990s, and it was estimated that at least 80 per cent of 
outmigration was legal (though some did overstay and thus 
became illegal).3 East Asia was one of most mobile and most 
tightly regulated regions in the world. The intermediary trap 
emerged not because the state was too weak, but because it 
was strong. It should not be read as a historical reversion to 
the time before the nation-state when the relation between 
the state and the subjects was mediated by the gentry and 
merchants.4 Rather, it signaled a new state-citizen relation in 
the context of globalization.
 In what follows, I will first sketch out the contours of 
the intermediary trap. I will then trace how the trap emerged 
in a larger context, namely the “infrastructural turn” in regulat-
ing labour migration in Asia, a trend that intensified from the 
early 2000s. This is followed by an overview of how the trap 
worked, particularly in relation to legality. Finally, I examine 
what happened when the intermediary business was seriously 
disrupted by migrants, states or the failures of other interme-
diaries. In doing so I demonstrate that the intermediary trap 
indicates some fundamental challenges that Chinese society 
faces today.   
  
Upstairs-downstream and downstairs-upstream
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The street in front of the US 
consulate in Shenyang, Liaoning 
province, northeast China. 
Opposite the consulate are 
commercial agencies that assist 
with filling out forms, translating 
documents, taking photos and 
interview coaching. The services 
are advertised on the signposts. 
(Xiang Biao 2008)
The number of migration intermediaries in China has grown 
much faster than labour outmigration itself. There were four 
licensed labour recruitment companies in the beginning of the 
1980s. By 2005 the number had risen to more than 3,000, and 
it has remained stable ever since.5 Also, many more interme-
diaries without the special international labour recruitment 
license worked in association with licensed intermediaries. 
All the intermediaries were referred to as zhongjie. Literally 
meaning “mediums in the middle”, zhongjie was an accurate 
term as the labour recruiters were neither “agents” who 
represented identifiable actors (principals) nor brokers who 
mediated among two or more parties to achieve pre-defined 
goals. On many occasions, they simply passed on information, 
filled forms, applied for visas and sought other intermediaries 
in order to find suitable would-be migrants according to infor-
mation given by yet another intermediary. “Go-between” is 
probably the closest English term. Instead of bridging demand 
and supply, intermediaries mainly worked with other interme-
diaries. 
 Chains of intermediaries that were hierarchically con-
nected were the empirical form of the intermediary trap. At 
the top of the chains were large, licensed companies. The 
exclusive licenses issued by the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Labour based on strict conditions gave these com-
panies authority to sign international contracts independently 
and process legal documents for migrants formally. They were 
thus called “window companies”—“windows” to the world.6  
By specializing in dealing with complex bureaucratic proce-
dures (of both China and the receiving country) and churning 
out documents, these windows turned migration from amor-
phous flows into a legible subject of governance. 
 But staff at the window companies, mostly located in 
Beijing and provincial capital cities, did not want to trek all 
the way down to villages to chat with potential migrants. They 
relied on middle-level intermediaries in the prefectures for 
recruitment, who in turn worked with sub-intermediaries in 
local districts, rural townships or even villages to source work-
ers. The grassroots intermediaries can be institutions such as 
local labour bureaus, vocational schools or individuals, usually 
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persons who enjoyed public authority such as retired cadres or 
school teachers. The grassroots institutions were often called 
“bases” (jidi), which was also an official term used in contracts 
and even government documents. The individuals were collo-
quially referred to as “the legs”.  
 The relations between the intermediaries were much 
more complex than business outsourcing. In everyday con-
versations among intermediaries, as well as among migrants, 
intermediaries closer to foreign clients (employers) were 
referred to as the “upstairs” (shangxian, literally meaning 
“the string above”), and those closer to migrants were the 
“downstairs” (xiaxian, “the string below”). Handed down from 
the upstairs to the downstairs were orders for labour, which 
were called zhibiao (quotas). They were so called because the 
orders were seen as analogous to the quotas for resource al-
location imposed top-down in China’s pre-reform, centralized 
command economy. The higher upstairs an intermediary was, 
the closer it was to the origin of quotas and the more powerful 
and profitable it became. 
 Government officials and staff at window companies, 
however, described the recruitment process differently. They 
called what were the upstairs the “downstream” (xiayou) 
and the downstairs the “upstream” (shangyou). What this 
narrative foregrounded was migrants who moved from the 
upstream (villages or districts of origin) to the downstream 
(destination), like a river. From the point of view of the govern-
ments of the receiving country, the place of origin—the up-
stream—was often a source of problems. Indeed, “root cause” 
has become a standard keyword in the global discourse of 
international migration management, where root refers to ori-
gin. While the migrants saw quotas from above as determining 
their migratory projects, the destination countries, sitting on 
the top floor, regarded themselves as potential victims—the 
clean downstream vulnerable to pollution from the upstream. 
The parallel of these two oppositional narratives reveals what 
intermediary chains were about. The interconnected interme-
diaries helped migrants navigate through the upstairs-down-
stairs hierarchy and at the same time assisted the states to 
channel upstream-downstream flows across states and state 
boundaries. In other words, they mediated between the fixed 
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state bureaucracy that attempted to control mobility from 
above and the migration flows that always potentially trans-
gressed administrative control from below.
 The vertical connections between upstairs-downstream 
and downstairs-upstream were only part of the relations 
among the intermediaries. Horizontal connections were equal-
ly, if not more, important. Window companies may pass on 
quotas to other windows because this enabled the companies, 
especially the individual staff who were directly involved, to 
earn extra profits and evade some regulations. It was estimat-
ed in 2008 that as many as 60 percent of window intermediar-
ies in China were doing “second-handed deals” (ershou danzi). 
They dealt in job openings passed on by other intermediaries 
instead of from foreign recruiters directly. Among the middle-
level intermediaries, the second-hand became third-, fourth-, 
fifth-handed and so on. Those who had job quotas eagerly 
sought workers who were willing to pay the most, and those 
who had found aspiring migrants needed suitable jobs quickly 
before the clients changed their minds. So many intermedi-
aries were involved at the middle-level that sometimes the 
passports of would-be migrants (ben’er, or “books”, as they 
were called in the business) were lost as they endlessly circu-
lated. As a typical example, an unlicensed, but well-connected 
middle-level intermediary in Liaoning province in northeast 
China promised to send a group of workers overseas, but failed 
to fulfill the commitment; the intermediary passed on the 
workers’ passports to another intermediary in the same city 
who boasted having strong overseas networks, only to receive 
the same “books” in a couple of weeks from an intermediary 
in Guangdong in south China. The Guangdong intermediary 
asked him to find jobs for the workers and promised high com-
mission fees! Middle-level intermediaries were dubbed kong-
shoudao players, Chinese for “karate”, literally meaning “the 
art of empty hands.” They made money not from any tangible 
assets that they possess, but by pulling strings, passing on 
information or people.
 There was the temptation to cut the chain short by 
skipping other intermediaries. For instance, a leg approach-
ing a window after getting relevant information from a middle 
level, was called “digging the tunnel” (wa digou) or “scaling 
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the wall” (fanqiang). While digging the tunnel meant that one 
circumvented other intermediaries secretly, scaling the wall 
implied a sense of defiance. A powerful window, for example, 
might scale the wall and land itself on a base directly. Both 
tactics were fiercely guarded against, and no one would sym-
pathize with you if you were punished by other intermediaries 
for playing with either the tunnel or the wall.  
 The intermediary chains did not come from nowhere. 
The trap had its historical roots in the command economy of 
the pre-reform era and was a direct product of state-led liber-
alization. The state bureaucracy and the intermediary chains, 
both hierarchically organized, intersected with each other at 
all levels.  Most staff in the intermediaries in China had con-
nections with government. Intermediaries sometimes had 
deeper connections with government agencies at the same 
level than they did with their business “downstairs” or “up-
stairs.” In some sense, intermediary chains can be seen as a 
mirror of the state bureaucracy. Therefore, in order to under-
stand how the intermediary trap emerged at this particular 
juncture in China, we must examine general changes in state 
regulation of mobility. 
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The rather stately exterior of a 
“window” company in Changchun, 
Jilin province, northeast China. 
(Xiang Biao 2006)
The infrastructural turn and the manufacturing of legality
Wang Youcai, a villager in his thirties, paid nearly 5,000 USD 
in 2005 to go to Singapore to work. Only after arrival did he 
find out that he had been given a tourist visa; he went back to 
China immediately, although the Singapore intermediary had 
already found a temporary job for him. Wang, usually appear-
ing incoherent, was very sharp in explaining why he returned 
and demanded a refund: “I can’t take it. I paid 38,000 [RMB]! If 
it was ‘black’ [to work illegally on a tourist visa], 10,000 would 
be enough!”7   
 The migrants’ desire for legality may look surprising 
for some. Illegality has become such a natural topic in migra-
tion studies in the West.8 Dealing with irregularity is seen as 
second nature for recruitment intermediaries: they circumvent 
state regulations (Castles and Miller 2003: 114), abuse mi-
grants’ rights (Global Commission of International Migration 
2005: 70) and are directly implicated in human trafficking.9  
While analyses of illegality are undoubtedly important, there 
is also a danger of questioning illegality by naturalizing legal-
ity. Migrant legality is utterly unnatural in the sense that it has 
to be positively constituted. While a citizen remains innocent 
until proved guilty, a migrant is by default illegal, unless one 
goes through all the procedures set by states. It is entirely in 
the states’ interest, regardless of the nature of the regime, to 
constitute migrant legality, simply because this is how they ex-
ercise their sovereign power and how they can control migra-
tion. Exclusion resulting from illegality is a by-product rather 
than a principle. Furthermore, how states deal with illegality, 
including through detention and deportation, is determined 
by their routinized and institutionalized processes of enforcing 
legality.10 We need to examine how legality and order are pro-
duced, how legality is made desirable and how legality appears 
unproblematic.  
 Legality became desirable not only because it was valu-
able, but because it was attainable—one can obtain migrant 
legality by paying more money, finding a proper intermediary, 
being patient and being lucky. The ways that legality becomes 
desirable in this sense are indicative of the new ways that the 
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Chinese and the receiving states in Asia governed international 
labour mobility. Previously, the Chinese state either prohib-
ited, or directly administered, outmigration. Ordinary citizens 
either had to be privileged enough to be selected to join 
government projects or turn to human smugglers. In either 
case there was no need, nor possibility, for an individual to 
acquire legality. From the late 1980s, international migration 
on individual initiative was first allowed and then encouraged, 
while the state at the same time put in place detailed regula-
tions to set the procedure for outmigration. The institutional 
and policy infrastructure for migration was simultaneously the 
infrastructure for migration regulation. Chinese policy makers 
often referred to this shift as one from a strategy of blocking 
(du) to an emphasis on channelling (shu). The hydraulic meta-
phors evoke the legend that Yu the Great (c. 2200 - 2100 BC) 
tamed flooding through canals that worked with the flows 
instead of dams against the river. Channeling is simultaneously 
facilitating and containing. 
 Following Michael Mann’s seminal essay on “infrastruc-
tural power” (Mann 1984), I call this shift the infrastructural 
turn.11 By “infrastructural power”, Mann means “the capacity 
of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to imple-
ment logistically political decisions throughout the realm” 
(1981: 113), as opposed to “despotic power”.  The infrastruc-
tural turn refers to the change that transnational migration is 
increasingly managed through infrastructural development as 
opposed to the control of bodily movement per se. Instead of 
controlling migration through the denial of citizens’ right to 
migration as it used to do, the Chinese state manages mobil-
ity by conditioning the logistics (e.g. recruitment procedures) 
that in turn condition citizens’ supposedly free choices and 
rational calculations.12 The infrastructural governance of labour 
mobility in East Asia had at least four characteristics: (1) the 
individualization of the subject, (2) the generalization of the 
method, (3) the distancing of government and the migrant 
and (4) a qualified faith in a spontaneous order. The individu-
alization of the subject means that the state took as the main 
subject of regulation individual migrants, instead of the proj-
ect-tied teams or collective (primarily work units) to which the 
individuals belonged. The generalization of the method refers 
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to the reliance on predicable, generally applicable legislation 
and regulations, as opposed to case-specific political decisions. 
The distancing refers to infrastructural governance aimed at 
regulating from afar rather than through direct intervention 
in the subject’s daily life.13 This is, in turn, associated with the 
assumption that migration would become self-correcting and 
self-regulating if proper channels were in place. Thus, there 
was a qualified faith in the spontaneous nature of the order, 
which is central to liberal thinking. The infrastructural turn in 
China was part of the general, albeit highly uneven and partial, 
transformation of the state from a despotic polity to a regula-
tory regime. In this process, the state simultaneously withdrew 
from certain domains and introduced new regulations, simul-
taneously freed social life from state control and penetrated 
social life more deeply and nimbly. 
 The infrastructural governance of mobility is not en-
tirely new. The migration of indentured Asian labour between 
the 1830s and the 1910s was probably the first major global 
experiment of infrastructural governance. As compared to the 
slave trade, which was primarily a matter of physical captur-
ing and transport, indentured labour migration was managed 
through regulations and new physical facilities. The regulations 
included those related to recruitment procedures, employ-
ment relations, health monitoring, transport conditions and 
facilities including depots, detention houses and quarantine 
centres. The replacement of indentured migration by the 
so-called free passage led to more sophisticated regulatory 
infrastructure, especially on the receiving side. As McKeown 
has brilliantly delineated, most of the immigration regulations 
in the US during the 19th century focused on the journey of 
migration—on the ship captains, the passenger brokers and 
the innkeepers rather than on the migrants themselves. By 
the 20th century, however, the authorities were almost solely 
concerned with whom the migrant was rather than how a 
migrant had travelled (McKeown 2008). The universalization 
of passports and the associated documentary regime changed 
the meaning of migration. How migrants moved spatially mat-
tered much less than how the movement was defined (e.g. 
”labour migrants” or “family migrants” ). The physical journey 
has become even less relevant today for both the migrants and 
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the states; very few informants mentioned border crossing as 
anything significant in their migratory experience. Why should 
it matter how one embarks on and alights from an airplane if 
his/her movement and location can be traced through elec-
tronic databases?  
 A good part of the 20th century, however, saw little 
development in migration infrastructure. Migration was either 
unregulated (e.g. cross-Atlantic migration), unregulatable 
(e.g. refugees), administered by the state (e.g. guestworker 
programmes) or, for the vast majority of the world’s popula-
tion, simply unpermitted.14  In Asia, migration infrastructure 
developed again in the 1970s with the increase in labour 
migration to the Gulf States and then other parts of the world. 
The Philippines stood out as a typical example, where multiple 
governmental and non-governmental agencies were set up 
and regulations put in place specifically aimed at assisting and 
monitoring labour outmigrants.
 The infrastructural governance of Chinese labour 
migration in Asia experienced a significant leap forward in the 
early 2000s. There were at least two reasons for this. First, af-
ter two decades of rather single-minded market-oriented eco-
nomic reform, in 2003 the Chinese state introduced new policy 
thinking that emphasized social welfare and protection.15 For 
this purpose, the leadership has since 2004 repeatedly called 
for strengthening the Party’s “governing capacity” (zhizheng 
nengli), which basically meant infrastructural power in Mann’s 
terms. This state needed strong infrastructure in place in order 
to enable, protect and regulate individuals, including those 
seeking jobs overseas. In the case of labour outmigration, the 
state allowed private companies to recruit workers on behalf 
of overseas employers in order to maximize overseas job op-
portunities, banned government agencies from commercial 
recruitment, and standardized and streamlined the procedures 
for outmigration. These measures opened up many more 
channels for legal migration than before, while making illegal 
migration and document forgery nearly impossible.
Second, on the receiving side, the infrastructural turn was 
driven by a tension between the fragmentation of labour 
management and the continuing centralized regulation of 
cross-border movements. Far from heading to “global cit-
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 03 No. 01 // 2013
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ies,” most migrant workers in the three destination countries 
studied took up manual jobs in private, small, low-end enter-
prises located in remote areas. Each employer needed a very 
small number of migrants. When the employment of migrant 
labour was dispersed and fragmented, the management of im-
migration remained a prerogative of the central government. 
Unlike managing project-tied, collective labour deployment, 
the receiving states now had to develop elaborate and nimble 
infrastructure to channel, follow, monitor and control the 
movements of particular individuals. 
 The infrastructural turn brought in new problems. 
While the individualization of the subject was essential, no 
individual fit into infrastructural governance unless he/she was 
molded into a governable legal subject in the first place. Forms 
needed to be filled out, photos to be taken, certificates to be 
authorized, qualifications to be demonstrated and guarantees 
to be secured, all having to be done in the “proper” way. To 
migrate legally was to transform oneself into a paper migrant. 
This was particularly true for unskilled labour migrants from 
China, as they were often subject to extra scrutiny in the re-
ceiving country. Furthermore, in order for infrastructural gov-
ernance to function, apart from establishing relations between 
migrant bodies and papers, there must be relations between 
papers and papers. A single paper such as a passport or a visa 
was certainly important, but what really mattered was the 
interconnection between the passport, the visa, the educa-
tion certificate, the skill recognition, the bank statement, the 
medical record and the criminal background. It is this intercon-
nectedness and systemic nature that distinguished infrastruc-
ture from mere facilities, tools and methods (Collier 2011). A 
seamless system of infrastructure, however, can be a complete 
mess for a person without expert knowledge.  
 Therefore, it is not surprising that would-be migrants 
paid intermediaries for “help”. Nor is it surprising that multiple 
intermediaries worked together to navigate through the infra-
structural grid. For instance, window companies may special-
ize in applying for work permits, the middle level may have 
special relations with public notaries to swiftly authenticate 
documents, and bases and legs may help with criminal clear-
ances and loan applications due to their connections with local 
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police stations and banks. 
 The infrastructural turn gave rise to a “migration infra-
structure industry” as compared to the better known “migra-
tion industry” or “migration business.”16 While the migration 
industry made money by getting the clients to the destination 
country, the migration infrastructure industry provided servic-
es that were necessary for migration, but may not be sufficient 
in and of themselves. In other words, the migration infrastruc-
ture industry charged you money even if you could not migrate 
in the end, just like business consultancies or lawyers charging 
for unsuccessful business plans or lost legal cases. Migration 
infrastructure became an industry also in the sense that it was 
profitable for intermediaries to participate in the develop-
ment of the infrastructure. For example, they provided trans-
port service, temporary accommodation and training courses 
to prepare would-be migrants to meet the requirements for 
language proficiency. Intermediaries could be more efficient in 
providing infrastructure than government departments be-
cause they often operated transnationally, constantly updated 
the training courses according to the latest requirements on 
the receiving side and worked with overseas intermediaries to 
arrange the most cost-effective transport. The migrants were 
fully aware of such a migration infrastructure industry and well 
accepted it as a reality. They never regarded their interactions 
with recruitment intermediaries as simply “buying” oppor-
tunities and visas. The cost was referred to as “fees” instead 
of “price”,17 and the process was called “banshouxu” (going 
through procedure). The migrants insisted that the papers that 
one bought without going through proper procedures (like the 
notion of “migration industry” implies) were suspicious and 
should be avoided.
 The biggest challenge of all for infrastructural gover-
nance was the contradiction between its formalist methods 
and its goal of effective regulation on the ground. Infrastruc-
tural governance relied on generally applicable and predict-
able rules and detailed paperwork, while its ultimate goal was, 
of course, to affect particular individual’s specific behaviour in 
constantly changing circumstances; on the one hand, it strove 
to govern from afar, on the other hand to locate a particular 
migrant and affect his/her behaviour close-up. As James Scott 
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(1998) has powerfully demonstrated, modern states often fail 
when trying to impose administrative fictions on social life. It is 
a bureaucratic fantasy that infinitely diverse local practices can 
be simplified into a grid which can be recorded and manipulat-
ed from the centre. The bureaucrats whom I interviewed were 
fully aware that they could not rely on such fantasies. As an of-
ficial at the Exit and Entry Management Bureau of the Chinese 
Ministry of Public Security told me, front-line officers won’t 
bother to step in the computer room unless they already had 
clear clues about what they were looking for in the database. 
For the bureaucrats who dealt with the real business on a 
daily basis, making migrants legible on paper was only a start-
ing point. The real thing was to make each and every migrant 
practically “trackable” at all times. Otherwise, the database is 
nothing but dead figures. 
 How did the regulators get the clues, and how did they 
track down the migrants when needed? Intermediaries served 
as indispensable points of action, or bashou (handles) as the 
Chinese call it, which the government can put its hands on and 
thereby act on migration flows. The governments in destina-
tion countries also held recruiters on their side responsible if 
migrants went underground or violated any rules. (Employers 
could also be the first point of contact, especially in labour dis-
putes, but recruitment intermediaries were still more effective 
“handles”, as employers increasingly relied on intermediaries 
for everything related to migration regulation). Foreign inter-
mediaries, in turn, used windows in China as their handles. An 
Osaka-based intermediary, for example, demanded compen-
sation of USD 50,000 from its counterparts in China for each 
worker who went missing or overstayed. Recruitment interme-
diaries in Singapore required a security bond of SGD 5,000 per 
worker from their associated windows in China, refundable 
only after the worker’s timely return to China. The Chinese 
government adopted the same strategy in a more radical man-
ner. In the case of migrant abuses or confrontations between 
migrants and employers (for instance, strikes), especially if 
they were reported in foreign media, the Chinese central 
government (most commonly the ministries of foreign affairs, 
commerce and labour) often ordered the window company to 
sort it out, regardless of whether the window had anything to 
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do with the problem. In a number of cases the windows were 
pressured to charter aircraft to bring all the workers back to 
China, which could bankrupt the companies. In order to avoid 
this, the windows used their downstairs as handles by de-
manding financial bonds beforehand and by asking for imme-
diate solutions in emergencies. The middle level, in turn, did 
the same with the bases and legs. 
 How, then, did such a chain of responsibility achieve 
actual control over mobility? More specifically, why could the 
“downward” allocation of liability—ending in the community 
of origin—affect migrants in the destination country? In order 
to understand this, we need to turn to another aspect of the 
intermediary trap, namely its disciplining function and the 
resultant “hierarchy of legality”.
Hierarchy of legality
One of the most striking findings from my field research is 
how intermediary chains constituted a transnational labour 
disciplinary system. The “downloading” of responsibility 
worked from the governments’ and intermediaries’ points of 
view because it converted their regulatory risks into migrants’ 
liabilities. The most common method for doing so since the 
early 1990s was to demand baozhengjin, “guarantee money”, 
from migrants before their departure, which was refunded 
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Instructions provided by the 
Japanese authorities explaining 
how to correctly fill out the 
application form for an unskilled 
migrant work permit. A total 
of 38 forms like this had to be 
completed. (Xiang Biao 2005)
only after the migrants returned to China without delay and 
without violating any rules (often including the rule that 
prohibited migrants from participating in strikes). The bond 
amounted to about RMB 20,000 for Singapore and Japan, and     
RMB 30,000 for South Korea in 2006. The bond for South 
Korea was higher because it was thought that migrants were 
more likely to go underground there due to a more developed 
informal economy. In addition to the bond, migrants often had 
to surrender their housing property certificates as well. How-
ever, these measures were still regarded as too weak. From 
the late 1990s, it became compulsory for the migrant to iden-
tify one or two civil servants as guarantors, who would have 
to compensate the intermediary for the migrant’s wrongdoing 
overseas. They either agreed to pay the money or, more com-
monly, to have their salaries deducted through an agreement 
between the civil servants, the employer and the intermedi-
ary. Civil servants were usually the most influential figures in 
an extended family or a friend circle, and pressure from them 
was more powerful in keeping the migrant in line than was the 
migrants’ own monetary loss. This led to a financialization of 
migration. Since would-be migrants had to cover all costs up-
front plus securities, migration was no longer simply a journey 
to work overseas, but became a financial project in which mi-
grants had to raise funds to invest. Migrants were much more 
concerned about the recovery of the investment than about 
the working conditions or employment relations overseas.
 As another preventive measure for disciplining work-
ers, legs often conducted detailed interviews with would-be 
migrants. Anyone who had relatives or friends overseas, or 
showed some knowledge about the destination country, 
was ruled out outright. It was feared that the networks and 
knowledge may embolden them to step out from the cage 
of legality. Golden Stage Ltd., an intermediary specializing in 
recruitment in Hebei province, north China, for example, paid      
RMB 500 to the village head in exchange for detailed informa-
tion about each candidate they recruited. On one occasion, 
Golden Stage had chosen a woman for a job in Japan, but the 
village head reported that the woman was divorcing, and the 
name was crossed out immediately. Jin Wan, manager gen-
eral of Golden Stage, told me proudly: “The woman may be 
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mentally and psychologically unstable when divorcing and may 
create problems overseas!”
 One of the most draconian methods of discipline was 
lianzuo, or “linked seats”. An invention by Emperor Qin of 200 
BC, lianzuo put a group of migrants—who may previously not 
know each other—into a team of collective punishment; if one 
misbehaved, all had to suffer. For instance, if a member of the 
team left the designated employer for a better paid informal 
job, all the rest of the team were threatened with deporta-
tion to China at their own cost. Fellow migrants were forced 
to police each other. This method worked particularly well, I 
was told, if the migrants were from the same community. In a 
particular case, after a worker absconded in South Korea, her 
family was immediately inundated by visits and telephone calls 
from the families of other linked-seat migrants. The worker 
swiftly and voluntarily returned to the factory. The linked-seat 
was commonly carried out by bases under instructions from 
the upstairs. 
 These disciplinary measures were legally dubious. The 
Chinese civil laws explicitly stipulated that one could not be 
held responsible for another’s behaviour, and that means of 
livelihood, such as houses, could not be used as security for 
general service contracts. The enforcement of contracts by 
confiscating houses and deducting the guarantors’ salaries 
were also against the law. However, these irregular and even 
illegal activities in the downstairs were critical for maintaining 
legality upstairs. Intermediaries manufactured and maintained 
legality not by stemming illegal activities, but by exporting 
problems to the sending side.
 Thus, a “hierarchy of legality” emerged. Hierarchy 
of legality here does not denote the ranking of laws so that 
specific and local laws were subjugated to the general and 
global. It instead refers to the inequality between physical 
locations where legality is presented differently, more specifi-
cally between the receiving and sending countries, the capital 
and remote communities, the city and the countryside. Most 
intermediaries in Beijing were licensed and engaged in le-
gal business only; problematic but necessary activities were 
outsourced both downward and outward to the countryside. 
Intermediaries in China often stressed that their counterparts 
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in Japan and Korea were more law abiding than those in China, 
without realizing that the good guy appeared good because 
the bad (themselves!) were made to be bad! 
 The transnational and trans-regional span of interme-
diary chains, thus, sustained a geopolitics of hypocrisy. This 
can be clearly illustrated by a change in Chinese labour migra-
tion to the Middle East in the 1990s. Ni An, a veteran in the 
labour migration business who worked for one of the largest 
state-owned international trading companies over the last two 
decades, told me: 
 
 A hierarchy of legality was central to manufactured mi-
grant legality. Manufactured legality was not at all fake legality. 
On the contrary, it may be more genuine than the “natural” 
legality. The socially manufactured and maintained legality 
profoundly conditioned the migrants’ intentions and actions. 
Various social relations were constantly enacted to ensure 
the legality. Manufactured legality was not a reflection of the 
actors’ intentions nor the inherent attributes of an action, but 
was a multifaceted phenomenon with complex internal struc-
ture. It is precisely because of this that the multi-level struc-
ture of the intermediary trap was particularly important.
The hierarchy of legality, in turn, reinforced this multi-level 
structure, particularly by creating a momentum of stretching 
the chains of intermediaries further downward. In order to en-
sure their legality, the upstairs—foreign employers, foreign in-
termediaries and China-based windows—were eager to source 
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In the early nineties, when I talked to the foreigners 
[recruiters], they told me what workers they wanted, I 
told them the number of our foreign currency account.18  
The commission must be paid to the account within ten 
days, otherwise forget it! Or, for some countries, you 
pay me the commission every month [after the migrant 
starts working]. But now the international society talks 
about human rights more and more. Foreign employers 
and intermediaries are not allowed to deduct workers’ 
wages. They must meet this criteria, that criteria. The 
employer doesn’t want to pay commissions anymore. 
Nowadays, we have to get our profit from the migrants 
here. […] And we have to get the profits for the foreign-
ers here too!19
labour from the remote, poor and vast countryside because 
workers from there were supposed to be more “innocent” 
and employers preferred workers with diverse places of origin, 
as this was seen to impede their self-organization. This drove 
the constant development of new recruitment bases (jidi). 
The stagnant wage levels, the nature of manual labour and 
the rather strict age limit set by the employers (most workers 
needed to be younger than 35) meant that intermediaries had 
to recruit workers from the relatively poor countryside, as the 
urban candidates were likely to be the only child of the family, 
some of whom would rather live off their parents instead of 
taking up manual jobs. The fragmentation of the employment 
of migrant labour on the receiving side—small enterprises 
hired a few workers each—also led to the fragmentation of 
recruitment—one had to look for a small number of migrant 
workers for a specific job at a particular moment of time. The 
proliferation of grassroots legs was almost inevitable.   
 The downward extension of recruitment chains also 
significantly compounded the financialization of migration. 
The poorer one was, the more money one had to invest. This 
was because the costs were higher for these workers in both 
relative terms—in relation to their incomes—and in absolute 
terms—resulting from the involvement of extra intermediar-
ies.20 It was certainly not an easy job to ask the poor to raise 
more money. The trick was not so much persuasion; what 
was more important was to spot the right candidate at the 
right time. Wu Xingtao, my key informant and a freelance 
middle-level intermediary based in Shenyang, the capital city 
of Liaoning province, northeast China, told me how he tried to 
maximize profit: “If I can find a woman who had just divorced, 
[who] felt [life in China] meaningless, I can easily charge her 
[RMB] 40,000 for going to Singapore. […] Believe it or not.” A 
divorced and “confused” woman was an ideal client, but find-
ing one obviously required widespread networks comprising 
multiple intermediaries. A divorced woman can be a desirable 
candidate, but also a risky one for the intermediaries as men-
tioned earlier. Only legs with intimate knowledge about the 
candidate could make a precise assessment. 
 The financialization of migration made migration a 
highly risky endeavour, which discouraged the would-be mi-
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grants from digging the tunnel, thus, reinforcing the multi-lev-
el structure. As would-be migrants repeatedly pointed out, if 
they were cheated once with their migration project, they may 
never be able to recover the financial loss in their life. Trust to-
wards intermediaries was essential. Migrants stuck to the legs 
who they “can see every morning when opening the door.” 
Wu Xingtao told me that he regularly processed documents 
that reached him through four or five intermediaries. He didn’t 
like it, but “they can’t trust us! What can you do? I can offer 
a cheaper price [for those who approached him directly], but 
they don’t want.” Suspicion about intermediaries was wide-
spread in local communities, so much so that the nature of 
advertisements for overseas job opportunities changed com-
pletely in the 1990s. An advertisement on a local (municipal) 
newspaper was unlikely to attract would-be migrants in the 
2000s because people were simply too wary to contact strang-
ers, and intermediaries bought the advertisements primarily 
to seek downstairs partners. The legs not only became longer, 
but were also firmly on the ground and could not be gotten rid 
of easily. 
 The infrastructural turn and the hierarchy of legality 
indicate how the labour recruiters were different from tra-
ditional intermediaries. First, the prevalence of traditional 
intermediaries reflected the incomplete centralization of state 
power and its weak capacity for penetrating society. Inter-
mediaries were indispensable for imperial China because the 
bureaucracy was small, while the country was vast.21 Inter-
mediaries became particularly active under the Qing dynasty, 
when the state’s capacity further declined, especially after the 
Taiping rebellion (Kuhn 2002). Second, the more modern inter-
mediaries that emerged in the process of state-building else-
where, such as political fixers in rural India (Reddy and Hara-
gopal 1985) and local bosses in Mexico (e.g. Wolf 1956), were 
bridges between a loosely organized society and the newly 
established, complex bureaucracy (Geertz 1960). By compari-
son, the labour recruiters in China and East Asia did not act as 
a bridge between the state and the society. Rather, they were 
simultaneously in the state and in society and constituted an 
integral part of a centralized and integrative system of gover-
nance. While intermediaries were normally conceptualized as 
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something “between”—between supply and demand, be-
tween receiving and sending sides, between society and the 
state, between deterritorializing economic impetus and ter-
ritorializing powers22 —the intermediary trap should be under-
stood as being within a particular process of order-making.
The dis-appearance of intermediaries 
The intermediary trap was always self-perpetuating. On the 
contrary, the trap was inherently unstable. When a particular 
intermediary failed to fulfil its obligations, the whole chain 
would be in trouble. A common scenario went like this. A win-
dow company expects a number of job quotas from overseas 
and asks downstairs for workers; the downstairs at multiple 
levels rushes to mobilize aspiring migrants because the more 
they recruited, the more profit they could make. In the end, 
a considerably larger number of people pay the initial instal-
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Advertisements for opportunities 
for outmigration on the door of a 
grassroots agency. The notices read 
“Recruiting 30 workers for Korea, 
monthly wage [RMB] 7,000-8,000, 
fee charged after visa issued”; 
“Urgent: recruiting for business 
visits to Korea, hurry up to apply!”; 
“Recruiting women for marriages 
in Japan, 3-month turn around”; 
“Business visit to Europe, male or 
female”. A “business visit” is one of 
the few channels whereby Chinese 
workers migrate legally and then 
work illegally overseas. (Xiang Biao 
2008)
ment than can be accommodated by the quotas that actually 
materialize. The imagined quotas, moreover, may never actu-
ally materialize. The would-be migrants demand refunds, but 
the money has already been spent by the intermediaries. The 
would-be migrants then sometimes occupy the intermediaries’ 
offices or even the managers’ homes to demand immediate 
compensation. 
 Constant disruptions of this kind, however, did not 
wipe out the intermediary business. The intermediaries who 
failed in their contractual duties may simply go into hiding and 
then re-emerge later. “Re-emerging from Mount East” (dong-
shanzaiqi) was a common experience among middle-level 
intermediaries. (The phrase originally referred to a preeminent 
scholar-official in the fourth century AD who returned to office 
after living as a hermit on the mountain when the state faced 
a crisis). Wu Xingtao, for instance, hid himself in the country-
side for about half a year in 2001 when he failed to refund his 
downstairs and the would-be migrants because his upstairs 
didn’t deliver what was promised (it was unclear to me wheth-
er the money was spent by Wu or taken away by the upstairs). 
He then moved to Dalian to work as a freelance subagent 
for a major recruitment company there, before returning to 
Shenyang in 2003 to work with a number of new partners. In 
2006, one of his partners ran away with RMB 800,000, includ-
ing RMB 300,000 collected by Wu from migrants. Wu repaid 
most of it from his own pocket. He predicted that the partner 
would make a comeback in a couple of years. Disappearance 
and re-appearance were seen as a matter of business cycles. 
Intermediaries could disappear and reappear like this, firstly 
because the highly complex inter-intermediary relations 
rendered straightforward legal verdicts difficult. It was often 
unclear who should be responsible for what. Government cor-
ruption was another important reason. Intermediaries were 
well-connected; they often hid in places where they had “pro-
tection umbrellas” (baohusan). Then, why didn’t other inter-
mediaries, including Wu Xingtao in the case mentioned above, 
track down the intermediaries who caused their loss? Wu had 
a simple explanation: “I can easily use my connection to get 
[him]. But what’s the benefit for me to send him to jail? [...] 
Let him lay low when the wind is strong. Wait until he comes 
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back and makes money. It won’t be too late for me by then to 
settle the account.” 
 Most surprisingly, however, would-be migrants did not 
always seek to punish intermediaries even when the financial 
loss was devastating. The victims sometimes instead made the 
local government their primary target in demanding compen-
sation. In a particular case that I followed in detail, the victims 
held the prefectural government responsible for issuing the 
intermediary the business license; the victims also listed all 
the connections that the intermediary had with government 
officials, especially family connections, suggesting that gov-
ernment corruption had emboldened the intermediary into 
behaving improperly. The government encouraged the victims 
to bring the intermediaries to court and suggested that they 
could sue the government by evoking administrative law. The 
victims refused. They instead staged dramatic public protests 
and solicited support from public media to pressure the local 
government to come up with swift administrative solutions to 
readdress their financial losses. Their most important leverage 
was to petition to the upstairs government agencies, especially 
the central state. Numerous letters were sent to any provincial 
and central government departments that could be remotely 
relevant, and group visits were made to various ministries in 
Beijing. 
 The migrants’ thinking was straightforward. The legal 
procedure would be long, complex and unpredictable in its 
outcome, and the court was untrustworthy as it was subject to 
government influence. Just like Wu, the migrants had no inter-
est in jailing the intermediary. All they wanted was to have the 
money back. The migrants, thus, translated a dispute about 
commercial transactions subject to legal arbitration into an 
issue of the welfare concerns of the disadvantaged that de-
manded relief from the state. While the government intended 
to define its relations to citizens in formalist legal terms, the 
migrants insisted on making claims in terms of substantive 
welfare and moral responsibility. Their petition letters were 
full of highly moralist and ideological language and presented 
themselves as powerless folks crying out for protection from 
the benevolent state.
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 The migrants expected this strategy to work—and to 
some extent it did—because the central state actively project-
ed itself as a morally responsible agent. The central leadership 
led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiaobao identified 
it as among the government’s new priorities when coming to 
power in 2003, to “place the people in the centre”, protect 
“disadvantaged groups” and ensure “citizen rights”. These 
buzzwords dominated official media and were actively de-
ployed by people in demanding government actions. In inter-
national labour migration, the central state encouraged the in-
frastructural turn precisely to make migrants controllable and 
protectable at the same time. The government put in place 
stringent regulations on the financial and professional qualifi-
cations of intermediaries, while allowing private companies to 
apply for the special licence on par with state-owned enter-
prises. They also set up national hearing centres and hotlines 
to process migrants’ complaints. The government regularly 
cracked down on “black intermediaries” (hei zhongjie). Offi-
cially “black intermediaries” meant those unlicensed, but the 
definition could be much broader in practice. Zhou Chaohui, 
formerly a senior manager of a state-owned window company 
and now the owner of a new window, commented: “If there 
is no problem, everything is fine and everyone is legal; if you 
make any trouble, then nothing is right and you are a black 
intermediary.” Stories were regularly reported about how in-
termediaries violated migrants’ rights by violating state regula-
tions and how, in return, they were punished by the govern-
ment. Blaming intermediaries was indispensable for the state 
to maintain its legitimacy and moral authority. Such a game of 
blaming was common across all the destination countries. 
 Thus, the intermediaries disappeared from would-be 
migrants’ agendas, and then reappeared as elusive evils by the 
state’s account. The disappearance is dis-appearance.23 The 
disappearance was not at all real disappearance in the sense 
that intermediaries were out of sight and out of mind. Rather, 
they loomed large in migrants’ consciousness all the time, 
but were deliberately made to disappear and then appear as 
something else. The hierarchy of legality can also be seen as 
about the dis-appearance of illegality that is a natural status of 
the migrants—illegality was made to disappear at the upstairs 
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and re-appear as disciplinary arrangements at the downstairs.   
 The migrants “dis-appeared” the intermediaries in 
order to speak to the state for direct relief. For them, problems 
with the intermediary trap had to be solved outside of the 
trap, i.e., outside of market rationality and legal procedures. 
The central state “re-appeared” the intermediaries as bad-
dies in order to maintain its moral authority, even though only 
a minority of the baddies could be brought to justice. There 
were obvious gaps between the agenda of dis-appearance 
and the strategy of re-appearance. They nevertheless forged a 
common ground—the morally imagined and expressed rela-
tions between citizens and the central state. 
 This moralized citizen-state relation that was evoked 
when market transactions broke down stood in sharp contrast 
to the daily interactions that were dominated by pragmatism 
and even opportunism. The would-be migrants were highly 
instrumentalist in dealing with both intermediaries and local 
government. They constantly stressed the importance of law, 
but took laws and the language of justice as tools to create 
pressure for gaining immediate benefits when interacting with 
local government. (When interacting with the central state, 
the would-be migrants saw laws as created and imposed by 
the state to be used as tools for fulfilling its moral duties and, 
thus, used laws as leverage for demanding direct solutions.) 
The instrumentalism in everyday practices and the moralism 
of the total political imagination reinforced each other. On the 
one hand, the market economy and the infrastructural turn 
introduced by the authoritarian state were devoid of moral 
meanings in everyday life. On the other hand, the central state 
increasingly resorted to moral gestures in order to maintain its 
power in a time of economic liberalization and administrative 
decentralization. This particular structure of political imagina-
tion also explains why China maintained relative stability as a 
whole despite serious instability at local levels, and why the 
central state enjoyed a relatively high level of legitimacy while 
conflicts between citizens and local government agencies ran 
deep and endemic. 
 Migration intermediaries made money by capitalizing 
on would-be migrants’ instrumentalist agendas and their faith 
in the central state as the ultimate security. The cost for the in-
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termediaries was to experience blame and punishment, rightly 
or wrongly, whenever the state regarded it as necessary. 
Nevertheless, the interlinked instrumentalization and mor-
alization sustained the intermediary trap. At the same time, 
this structure may not be sustainable in itself. Will the morally 
construed relation between citizens and the central state also 
become instrumentalized one day? What will happen if the 
central state fails to satisfy the populace demanding that it 
discipline the intermediaries and pressure local governments? 
The future of the intermediary trap is contingent on the devel-
opment of the general sociopolitical situation in China. 
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ENDNOTES
1 These were the going rates in Liaoning province, northeast 
China, at that time. The fees were significantly higher in the 
southeast.
2 Between 2002 and 2004, a number of Asian countries 
including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Malaysia passed 
legislation to govern immigration more systematically and 
effectively. On South Korea, see Seol and Skrentny (2009). On 
Taiwan, see Chia-Wen (2009). 
3 An estimate of my informants. Chu (2010) also noted a clear 
decline of illegality and increased desirability of legal channels 
in Fujian province, the most prominent place for illegal 
outmigration in China.
4 On the role of gentry in the countryside, see Wu and 
Fei (1948). On urban merchants as social and political 
intermediaries, see Rowe (1987).
5 Interviews with officials at the Ministries of Commerce and 
Labour; various ministry documents. 
6 The term “window” has its origin in China’s strict “single-
window” policy in international relations that required all 
matters related to foreign countries to be handled by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its local branches. 
7 During my fieldwork, RMB 5,000 was the lowest price that 
I found for traveling to Singapore on a tourist visa and then 
overstaying.
8 Among the recent powerful accounts of illegal migration, see 
de Genova (2002); Lucht (2012); Inda (2006); Vigh (2009). 
9 This is a common assumption adopted by national 
governments and especially by NGOs. For examples related 
to Indonesia, see Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, 
Republic of Indonesia (2005); Department of State, USA 
(2009). For critical analyses of this conflation, see Anderson 
and Andrijasevic (2008: 138); Tigno (2012: 23-40).  
10 As an important recent trend, national governments and 
international organizations across the world have invested 
heavily in increasing state capacity in regulating mobility (see 
also Global Commission of International Migration 2005). 
11 I thank Johan Lindquist for his help in developing this 
thought. 
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12 The similarity between the infrastructural turn and the 
notion of governmentality, or the “conduct of conduct” as 
Foucault (1982; 1991) put it so succinctly, is obvious. But 
unlike Foucault—who stressed that power is diffusive, all-
embracing, un-locatable, capillary-like and  “reaches into the 
very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts 
itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, 
learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 1980: 30)— 
I aim to map out specific institutional logics and structural 
effects of the infrastructural turn. I seek to locate power and 
responsibilities, which I see as an indispensable precondition 
for developing engaged critiques.   
13 These characteristics are also part of the general social 
transformation of China today (see Zhang and Ong 2008). 
For phenomena associated with distancing and for 
individualization, see Yan (2010). 
14 This is not to say that states effectively managed migration 
or that supposedly unpermitted migration did not happen. 
However, this dominant governmental rationality prevents the 
development of migration infrastructure.
15 This agenda is likely to remain or even strengthen with the 
new leadership that came to power in late 2012.
16 For general discussions on the “migration industry” and 
“migration business”, see Harris (1995); Salt (1997).
17 For an illuminating discussion of how problematic it is from 
the migrants’ view to refer to private intermediaries charging 
“prices” and embassies demanding “fees”, see Alpes (2011). 
18 Foreign currency was tightly controlled in China, and only 
state-owned companies were allowed to possess foreign 
currencies in special bank accounts. 
19 Interview, 16 April 2006, Beijing, Office of Ni. 
20 A rural resident may have had to pay up to RMB 5,000-8,000 
more (out of the RMB 50,000 total) for going to Singapore in 
the mid-2000s than did those in big cities such as Shenyang or 
Dalian in Liaoning province.
21 In Southeast Asia, tax farming fluctuated largely as a function 
of the strength of colonial authorities, see (Butcher and Dick 
1993).
22 For a classical definition of intermediaries from such an “in-
between” perspective, see Boissevain (1974); Bailey (1969).
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23 This formulation is inspired by Abbas’ (1997) discussion on 
the “disappearance” of Hong Kong.
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